The Partnership Needs A Return Ticket

The Russia-Africa summit has an appealing official theme: mutually beneficial cooperation. Before signing anything, it might be worth asking who is defining “mutually” and whether the return ticket is included.

Delegations and leaders from African countries are gathering in Moscow for the October 28–29 meeting, with trade, investment and security on the agenda. Al Jazeera reports that the programme includes more than 40 sessions covering everything from energy and technology to healthcare and youth exchange. There are about 100 speakers. Diplomatic optimism is available in several breakout rooms.

Outside that programme sits a rather less comfortable request. Amnesty International has urged attending leaders to demand an end to what it describes as deceptive and coercive recruitment of Africans to fight for Russia in Ukraine. The allegation is Amnesty’s, and the summit’s opening is not a finding that every recruitment arrangement fits it. It is still a serious question for a meeting selling partnership.

“Youth exchange” ought to mean young people exchanging ideas, skills and opportunities. If officials need to clarify that it does not mean exchanging a civilian future for somebody else’s war, the brochure may require more than a proofread.

African countries have real reasons to pursue trade and diplomatic options. Russia supplies wheat and fertilizer, and has energy and nuclear agreements across the continent. Al Jazeera puts trade above $28 billion, up from an estimated $16.8 billion in 2019, while noting that it remains concentrated in a few countries and smaller than trade with China and the European Union. African governments do not need to justify every commercial conversation to Western capitals.

But independence from one powerful partner is not automatically independence from the next one. A wider choice of suppliers is useful. A wider choice of governments that expect you to overlook their conduct is a less exciting development product.

The security side deserves particular attention. Al Jazeera cites the African Security Analysis consultancy’s count of Russian missions or troops in at least nine African countries, compared with a much smaller presence in 2023. Analysts suggest meetings with Russian defence officials on the sidelines may reveal more about the relationship’s direction than the main event. The stage has the theme. The side room has the terms.

That is why the recruitment concern belongs in the discussion rather than in a discreet pile marked unfortunate complications. People recruited through deception or coercion, if those allegations are borne out, are not a minor public-relations inconvenience for otherwise successful diplomacy. Their safety and freedom are part of what a government is supposed to negotiate for.

A final declaration and a cooperation plan for 2027–2029 are expected by the summit’s end. They had not yet become completed achievements in the reporting used here. There is plenty of room for useful agreements, and no need to invent what will be signed.

There is also room for a very practical test. A partnership that promises to unlock a country’s potential should be able to explain how its people remain free to say no. If that question ruins the atmosphere, the atmosphere was doing too much of the work.